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Abstract: Recently, some philosophers have argued that we should take quantifi-
cation of any (finite) order to be a legitimate and irreducible, sui generis kind of
quantification. In particular, they hold that a semantic theory for higher-order quan-
tification must itself be couched in higher-order terms. Øystein Linnebo has crit-
icized such views on the grounds that they are committed to general claims about
the semantic values of expressions that are by their own lights inexpressible. I show
that Linnebo’s objection rests on the assumption of a notion of semantic value or
contribution which both applies to expressions of any order, and picks out, for each
expression, an extra-linguistic correlate of that expression. I go on to argue that
higher-orderists can plausibly reject this assumption, by means of a hierarchy of no-
tions they can use to describe the extra-lingustic correlates of expressions of different
orders.
∗ I am grateful for many very helpful discussions with and comments from John Divers, Rob-
bie Williams, Joseph Melia, Benjamin Schnieder, Alex Steinberg, Robert Schwartzkopff, Nick
Haverkamp, Mirja Holst, and Øystein Linnebo, as well as two anonymous referees for this journal.
1
1 Introduction
Starting with George Boolos’s seminal work (esp. 1985), various authors have argued
for the view that higher-order languages are not only intelligible and legitimate devices
which are not paraphrasable in first-order terms, but that an adequate semantics for such
languages can and should itself be couched in higher-order terms. In particular, in such a
semantics, the truth-conditions of object language second-order quantifications are spec-
ified by means of a second-order quantification in the meta-language. Call this view
higher-orderism. In his ‘Sets, Properties, and Unrestricted Quantification’ (2006), Øys-
tein Linnebo argues against higher-orderism by trying to show that its proponents face a
peculiar kind of expressive limitation: they are committed to certain substantive semantic
principles which, by their own lights, cannot be expressed. In this paper, I present a way
for higher-orderists to resist this conclusion.
My argument proceeds in two main steps. First, I show that Linnebo’s objection rests
on the assumption that there is a notion of the semantic contribution of an expression
which has the following two properties: it applies to expressions of any syntactic cat-
egory, and for every such expression, the notion picks out a (typically) extra-linguistic
correlate of that expression which determines the latter’s effect on the truth-conditions
of sentences in which it occurs. Second, I make a case that for all Linnebo has said, a
tenable version of higher-orderism can be developed according to which there is no such
notion. Roughly, the central claim of the view that emerges is that although for every
expression, one can speak of something like its “extra-linguistic correlate”, there is no
unified, cross-categorically applicable notion that serves this purpose. Rather, there is a
hierarchy of such notions, mirroring the hierarchy of syntactic categories in the object
language. The temptation to “collapse” these into a single notion is explained as an in-
stance of our more general unreflective but paradox-prone habit in natural language to
nominalize expressions of non-nominal categories.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Sect. 2 explains what higher-orderism is and
sketches the dialectical context of Linnebo’s objection against the view. Sect. 3 examines
that objection in detail and shows that it relies on the assumption of a unified notion of
extra-linguistic semantic contributions. Sect. 4 argues that although this claim has some
initial plausibility, higher-orderists can sensibly reject it, and they can offer a plausible
explanation why, although false, the claim seems intuitively appealing. It presents the
hierarchy of notions of extra-linguistic correlates that the higher-orderist can appeal to and
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indicates why it is tempting to “collapse” that hierarchy into a single first-order notion.
Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Background
The first-order quantifiers ‘∃x’ and ‘∀x’ bind variables that stand in the syntactic position
of singular terms. A second-order quantifier, in my use of the term, is a quantifier that
binds variables which stand in the syntactic position of sentence-forming operators which
take singular terms as arguments, i.e. ordinary first-order predicates.1 A third-order quan-
tifier, by analogy, is a quantifier that binds variables which stand in the syntactic position
of sentence-forming operators which (in at least one of their argument places) take first-
order predicates as arguments, i.e. second-order predicates. The characterization extends
in the obvious way to n’th-order quantification, for arbitrary (finite) n. The view I call
‘higher-orderism’ consists of essentially three theses concerning this syntactic hierarchy
of quantifiers: firstly, that quantification of any order is a legitimate, (in principle) in-
telligible linguistic device; secondly, that n’th-order quantifications cannot be adequately
paraphrased by quantifications of an order lower than n; thirdly, that adequate seman-
tic clauses for n’th-order quantifications must employ n’th-order quantifiers of the meta-
language in much the same way in which the standard semantic clauses for first-order
quantification employ first-order quantifiers of the meta-language.
We shall only consider the higher-order analogues to ‘∃x’ and ‘∀x’. Their second-order
analogues, for instance, permit the formulation of sentences such as
(1) ∃X (Xa & Xb).
(2) ∀X (Xa∨¬Xa).
We can approximate their intended meanings by the natural language sentences ‘some
property is had by both a and b (namely, the property of being tall)’ and ‘every prop-
erty is such that a has it or a does not have it’. According to higher-orderism, however,
these readings cannot be strictly adequate, for they interpret the second-order quantifiers
by means of first-order quantification over properties, as witnessed by the fact that the
‘namely’-rider demands a singular noun phrase (‘the property of being tall’) as its com-
plement.
1 For simplicity, I ignore operators which form expressions other than sentences, such as singular term-
forming functors on singular terms.
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There are two strategies that have been pursued in the literature in attempting to find
better interpretations of second-order quantification in natural language. The first is Boo-
los’s famous proposal of using plural nominal quantifiers, reading e.g. (1) roughly as
follows: ‘some things are such that a is one of them and b is one of them, too (namely,
the tall things)’ (cf. esp. Boolos 1984). As witnessed by the appropriate ‘namely’-rider,
the quantifier phrases used here govern the position of a plural noun phrase. The second
strategy is to make use of non-nominal quantificational devices in English. The availabil-
ity of such devices, and their apparent suitability for interpreting the formal second-order
notation, was first emphasized by Arthur Prior (cf. his 1971, ch. 3) and recently devel-
oped in some detail by Agustı´n Rayo and Stephen Yablo 2001. On this proposal, we may
read (1) and (2) as ‘there is something such that a is that, and b is that, too (namely, tall)’,
‘everything is such that a is that or it is not the case that a is that’, respectively. Here, the
quantifiers are associated with adjectival rather than nominal position, as witnessed by
the fact that the ‘namely’-rider demands an adjectival expression as its complement.
For our purposes, it is not very important which of the readings is preferred, or whether
perhaps neither can be considered fully satisfactory by higher-orderists’ lights. For natu-
ral languages uncontentiously do not provide us with the resources required to translate
quantifications of, say, the seventeenth order. So it is at any rate clear that in the general
case, we have to come to understand the higher-order quantifiers without being able to rely
on translation into independently understood vocabulary.2 Since Linnebo does not object
to this aspect of higher-orderism, I shall proceed on the assumption that in principle, we
can in some way learn the meanings of quantifiers of arbitrarily high orders.
The plural and the non-nominal reading of second-order quantifiers plausibly neverthe-
less correspond to two different conceptions of the higher-orderists’ hierarchy of quanti-
fiers: one that it is natural to gesture at by talking of pluralities, pluralities of pluralities or
super-pluralities, and so on, and one that is more naturally approximated by talk of prop-
erties, properties of properties, etc. The issues to be discussed below arise in the same
way on either picture (cf. Linnebo 2006, 154); just to fix ideas, I shall be assuming the
latter conception, since it seems to fit better with the intended predicational character of
the formal quantifications (cf. Rayo and Yablo 2001, 78ff, Williamson 2003, 455ff).
One of the main motivations for accepting higher-orderism is that it appears to provide
2 For some discussion of how far “up” we may be able to get using only natural language resources,
see Rayo and Yablo 2001, sec. X, Linnebo and Nicolas 2008, the ‘Appendix on Pairing’ by Lewis,
Burgess, and Hazen in Lewis 1990, as well as Hazen 1997.
4
a means of developing an adequate semantics for languages with unrestricted first-order
quantifiers. Whether and how a semantics for such languages can be constructed is the
main topic of Linnebo 2006, whose primary goals are to show that the higher-orderists’
proposal faces severe difficulties, and to develop a better account. I shall here be con-
cerned only with the extent to which Linnebo has achieved the first goal. In the remain-
der of this section, I sketch the problem that absolutely general first-order quantification
poses for semantic theorizing, and how higher-orderism appears to provide a solution to
that problem.
Let L1 be an ordinary, monadic, extensional first-order language without function sym-
bols whose quantifiers range over absolutely everything.3 We assume that an adequate
semantics for L1 takes the shape of a specification of the truth-conditions of the sentences
of L1 relative to arbitrary ways of interpreting L1’s non-logical constants. The difficulty
in developing a semantics for L1 is that it appears to be impossible to specify a notion of
an interpretation such that the following holds: If it is possible informally to interpret a
predicate P of L1 so that it applies to all and only Fs, then there is an interpretation under
which it applies to all and only Fs.
On a popular approach, an interpretation of L1 is a function mapping names and pred-
icates of the object language to objects and sets of objects, respectively. Under such an
interpretation i, a predicate P applies to all and only the members of i(P). Yet it appears
possible informally to interpret P so that it applies to all and only sets. Since there is no
set of all sets, however, there is no interpretation of the envisaged kind under which P
applies to all and only sets.
More generally, given any notion of an interpretation, it seems possible informally to
interpret a predicate P as applying to something x just in case x is not an interpretation
under which P applies to x.4 But the hypothesis that there is an interpretation under which
P applies to something x under just that condition logically implies a contradiction. For
suppose that iR is such an interpretation:
(3) For every object x, iR is an interpretation under which P applies to x iff x is not an
interpretation under which P applies to x.
Instantiating the universal quantification in (3) with iR yields the inconsistent
3 The assumption of monadicity, i.e. that every predicate of L1 (other than ‘=’) is one-place, is purely
for ease of exposition.
4 The argument to follow is Williamson’s cf. 2003, 426.
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(4) iR is an interpretation under which P applies to iR iff iR is not an interpretation under
which P applies to iR.
Note that if the object language quantifiers were restricted to a domain D, the application
conditions of predicates would need to be defined only for the members of D. The uni-
versal quantifier in (3) could thus be restricted to D, and instantiation of it with iR would
depend on the assumption that iR is in D. The contradiction obtained on that assumption
would thus simply be taken to show that the assumption is false. The problem arises
because L1’s quantifiers are unrestricted.
How does higher-orderism provide a way out of this difficulty? On the above approach,
the assumption that it is possible informally to interpret a predicate in such and such a way
is translated into a first-order existential quantification ‘some interpretation i is such that
. . . ’. Higher-orderism makes room for an alternative approach on which that assumption
is translated into a second-order quantification.5 Specifically, in place of the first-order
variable ‘i’, we use a two-place second-order variable ‘I’.6 Whereas on the first-order
approach, we define interpretation-relative application conditions for predicates by
(5) ∀x (P appliesi to x↔ x ∈ i(P))
we now have
(6) ∀x (P appliesI to x↔ I(P,x))
Accordingly, in order to capture the possibility of interpreting P as applying to all and
only Fs, we no longer need it to be the case that
(7) ∃i i(P) = {x : Fx}
but only that the following second-order quantification be true:
(8) ∃I ∀x (I(P,x)↔ Fx)
5 There may be independent, informal reasons for regimenting talk of interpretations of predicates in
terms of second-order vocabulary cf. Williamson, 2003, 453. – For discussion and development
of the higher-order approach to the problem of absolute generality, see also Boolos 1985, Rayo and
Uzquiano 1999, and Rayo 2006.
6 As is customary, I use uppercase letters for higher-order variables. For orders greater than 2, the
order of the variable is indicated with a superscript. Note that I also use uppercase letters such as ‘P’
and ‘S’ as first-order meta-lingustic variables ranging over object language predicates and sentences,
respectively.
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On this approach, our counterpart to the singular term ‘iR’ in (3) is a predicate ‘IR’. Since
the universal quantifier ‘for every object x’ is first-order, it cannot be instantiated with that
predicate, so the derivation of the inconsistent (4) is blocked.
Let us briefly consider how to interpret names on the higher-order approach. The sim-
plest option is to restrict ‘I’ by the condition ‘for every name n, ∃x (I(n,x) & ∀y (I(n,y)→
x = y))’ thus ensuring, roughly speaking, that every interpretation associates every name
with a unique object. In what follows, I shall prefer the technically slightly less con-
venient approach of interpreting names by using a separate variable ‘i’ which forms a
singular term when combined with one, thus emphasizing the difference between the way
names and predicates are interpreted on the higher-order approach.
In order for the present proposal for a semantics for languages with absolute general-
ity to work, we require the full strength of higher-orderism. Evidently, if a second-order
quantification such as (8) could be adequately paraphrased by first-order quantifications
over objects of some sort, we should immediately fall back into contradiction. So the use
of higher-order quantification to regiment talk of interpretations helps only given higher-
orderism’s rejection of any such paraphrase. Similarly, unless it is denied that an adequate
semantics can also be developed for the meta-language of L1, the move to higher-order
quantification helps only given higher-orderism’s rejection of a first-order semantic ac-
count of second-order quantification. For on any such account, a second-order quantifica-
tion such as (8) is true only if there is a suitable object (set) included in the range of the
bound second-order variable.7 Any such account would therefore render (8) equivalent to
a first-order quantification like (7), once again reintroducing inconsistency.
Moreover, by an analogue of the argument from (3) to (4), one can show that, roughly
speaking, an adequate semantics for a second-order language like our meta-language for
L1 must employ third-order quantification to regiment talk of interpretations.8 A seman-
tics for that meta-meta-language then must make use of fourth-order quantification, and
so on.9 Thus, unless we at some point deny even the in principle possibility of con-
structing an adequate semantics for a language we make use of in semantic theorizing,
7 I set aside here (and throughout the paper) the possibility of a substitutional semantics for second-order
quantification.
8 The same conclusion can also be reached through a related but slightly simpler argument from cardi-
nality considerations; see Linnebo and Rayo, 2012, Appendix B. Thanks here to Øystein Linnebo.
9 Strictly speaking, the situation is slightly more complicated, but the crucial point remains: as long
as we allow for the possibility of giving an adequate semantics for whatever language we use in
constructing a semantic theory, we keep having to introduce additional ideology of higher and higher
orders cf. Linnebo, 2006, 152f, n8. For a detailed examination of these issues, see Rayo 2006.
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we are forced up through the entire hierarchy of (finite) orders of quantification. So the
approach seems to also depend on the commitment of higher-orderism to the legitimacy
and irreducibility of quantification of any finite order.10
3 Linnebo’s Objection
Linnebo tries to show that higher-orderists – he calls them ‘type-theorists’ – suffer from a
peculiar kind of expressive limitation: ‘on their view, there are certain deep and interesting
semantic insights that cannot properly be expressed’ 2006, 154. His argument proceeds
in three steps. In the first step, Linnebo introduces a notion of the semantic value, or
semantic contribution, of an expression. The second step consists in a series of claims
concerning the view higher-orderists must hold with respect to the nature of the semantic
contributions made by various sorts of expressions. In the third step, Linnebo argues that
in virtue of holding that view, higher-orderists are committed to certain claims that cannot,
by their own lights, be properly expressed.
So as to have an idea of where we are going, it is helpful to have in mind what sort of
claim might be an instance of this kind of elusive commitment of higher-orderism. Here
are the examples Linnebo offers (ibid.):
Infinity. There are infinitely many different kinds of semantic value.
Unique Existence. Every expression of every syntactic category has a semantic value
which is unique, not just within a particular type, but across all types.
Compositionality. The semantic value of a complex expression is determined as a func-
tion of the semantic values of the expression’s simpler constituents.
Let us grant that if higher-orderists are committed to these claims, but cannot, by their
own lights, express them, then that result counts strongly against higher-orderism. So let
us examine the antecedent of this conditional.
By way of explaining the intended notion of the semantic value of an expression, Lin-
nebo writes:
10 If we also allow for a single language containing quantifiers of every finite order, and if we allow that
for that language, too, we can construct an adequate semantics, we have to go beyond the hierarchy of
finite orders of quantification. Since the desire to deal with absolute generality by itself does not seem
to force us to allow for such a language, I set this (considerable) issue aside for the purposes of this
paper. For discussion, see Linnebo and Rayo, 2012.
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Each component of a sentence appears to make some definite contribution to the truth
or falsity of the sentence. This contribution is its semantic value. It further appears
that the truth or falsity of the sentence is determined as a function of the semantic
values of its constituents. This is the Principle of Compositionality. Linnebo, 2006,
154
This gloss relies on an intuitive notion of an expression’s (semantic) contribution to the
truth or falsity of a sentence in which it occurs. That notion is assumed to have three
important properties. First, it is assumed to have general, cross-categorical application,
so that every component, of whatever syntactic category, of a given sentence makes a
semantic contribution to the sentence’s truth or falsity. Second, it is assumed to satisfy a
uniqueness constraint. For each component of a given sentence, there is exactly one thing
that is its semantic contribution to the truth-value11 of the sentence. We may summarize
these two assumptions in the following principle:12
(SC1) Every (meaningful, unambiguous) expression makes a unique semantic contribu-
tion to the truth or falsity of sentences in which it occurs.
Finally, it is assumed that the truth-value of a given sentence is (functionally) determined
by the semantic contributions of its constituents.
(SC2) For each sentence, its truth or falsity is determined by the semantic contributions
of its constituents.
The notion of an expression’s semantic value is then identified with this intuitive notion
of its semantic contribution, or perhaps some theoretical explication of it.
It is prima facie plausible that there is a notion of semantic contributions that satisfies
(SC1) and (SC2), or at least some refinement of them. It should be noted, though, that the
assumption that there is such a notion appears to have a dialectically somewhat peculiar
status. For instance, (SC2) seems very closely related to Compositionality, a claim that
11 It is worth emphasizing that by speaking informally of a sentence’s truth-value I do not mean to
commit myself to the claim that the best semantic treatment of sentences assigns to them a special
sort of object, namely a truth-value. Indeed, the most natural implementations of the kind of semantic
views I shall suggest to the higher-orderist do not do so, but take a shape closer to the Davidson-Tarski
tradition in which we simply specify truth-conditions for sentences without assigning to them objects
as their truth-values.
12 Unlike our above formulations, (SC1) implies that expressions make the same contributions to all
sentences in which they occur. At least for the kinds of formal language we are concerned with, this
further assumption appears unproblematic.
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according to Linnebo, higher-orderists would have to consider inexpressible.13 If so, and
if the same is true of (SC2), then according to higher-orderism, the very sentences used
in the attempt to introduce the notion of a semantic value would seem defective in that
they could not possibly express what they are used to try to express. In that case, it seems
that higher-orderists should have to consider Linnebo’s argument not as a proof that they
have inexpressible commitments, but as a reductio on the assumption that (SC1)–(SC2)
succeed in characterizing a coherent notion. Of course, this would not mean that higher-
orderists have nothing to worry about. For since it does appear initially plausible that the
principles characterize a coherent notion, the result that they do not would also seem to
count against higher-orderism. Our observation does hint, however, that strictly speaking,
the expressibility of certain putative semantic commitments may not be exactly the right
issue for higher-orderists to worry about. For now, we proceed on the assumption that
(SC1)–(SC2) successfully characterize a coherent notion of semantic contributions.
We turn now to the second step in Linnebo’s argument, in which he offers a number
of claims about the semantic contributions of various sorts of expressions that he takes
higher-orderism to be committed to. I quote the pertinent passage in full.
We have seen that the type-theorists [deny] [. . . ] that interpretations are objects.
We have also seen that this forces the type-theorists up the hierarchy of higher and
higher levels of quantification. This commits the type-theorists to a deep and inter-
esting semantic view. On this view, proper names make a distinctive kind of semantic
contribution to sentences in which they occur, namely the objects to which they refer.
Likewise, monadic first-order predicates make a distinctive kind of semantic contri-
bution: loosely speaking, a function from objects to truth-values, but, according to
the type-theorist, properly represented only by means of second-order variables. And
so it continues up through the types: for each natural number n, monadic n’th-order
predicates make a distinctive kind of semantic contribution, properly represented
only by means of (n+1)’th-order variables. Linnebo, 2006, 154.
Let us first try to see exactly what the claims are that Linnebo thinks higher-orderists are
committed to, and then ask whether they are indeed so committed. It is best to begin with
the case of monadic first-order predicates. We may contrast two (partial14) readings, one
13 The analogous observation applies to the uniqueness condition in (SC1) and Linnebo’s Unique Exis-
tence.
14 My formulations lack the explicit implication that the contributions of monadic first-order predicates
form a ‘distinctive kind’. If they do, this will presumably follow from the description of what they are
like.
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fairly literal and one less so, of Linnebo’s formulation of the higher-orderists’ view of
their semantic contributions and in particular of the description of some contributions as
‘properly represented only by means of second-order variables’:
(L.1) For every monadic first-order predicate P, there is something which is the semantic
contribution of P. Loosely speaking, that thing is a function from objects to truth-
values. Strictly speaking, it is properly represented only by a second-order variable.
(L.2) Loosely speaking, for every monadic first-order predicate P, there is a function
from objects to truth-values which is the semantic contribution of P. Strictly speak-
ing, only an analogue of this claim is true, in which the first-order quantification
over functions from objects to truth-values is replaced by a monadic second-order
quantification.
(L.1) is closer to Linnebo’s actual formulation, so we shall consider it first. Setting aside
the part which is supposed to be only loosely correct, an obvious semi-formal rendering
of the claim reads as follows:
(9) ∀P ∃x (x is the semantic contribution of P & x is properly represented only by a
second-order variable).
(9), and thus (L.1), has a much simpler defect than giving rise to inexpressible commit-
ments: it is clearly false. Surely, being a value of a given variable is sufficient for being
properly represented by it. So every value of the first-order variable ‘x’ is properly rep-
resented by a first-order variable and therefore does not satisfy the open sentence ‘x is
properly represented only by a second-order variable’. However, there is no obvious rea-
son why a higher-orderist should have to accept (9) or (L.1). So let us instead consider
the second reading (L.2) of Linnebo’s formulation.
Abbreviating ‘function from objects to truth-values’ by ‘concept’, we may regiment the
claim that (L.2) presents as loosely correct as follows:
(10) For every monadic first-order predicate P: ∃x (x is a concept & x is the semantic
contribution of P).
What is strictly true, according to (L.2), is a paraphrase of (10), in which the first-order
quantification over concepts is replaced by a monadic second-order quantification. If we
simply substitute a second-order variable ‘X’ for the first-order ‘x’ in (10) and drop the
restriction to concepts, we obtain
11
(11) For every monadic first-order predicate P: ∃X X is the semantic contribution of P.
(11), however, is ill-formed, for instantiating the second-order quantification with, say,
the predicate ‘is red’ yields the ungrammatical result ‘is red is the semantic contribution
of P’. To obtain a well-formed higher-order paraphrase of (10), we need a second-order
predicate in place of ‘is the semantic contribution of’. Thus, let ‘SC’ form a sentence
from a monadic predicate and a singular term, so that
(P1) For every monadic first-order predicate P: ∃X SC(X , P).
is well-formed. Now if this sentence is to express an answer to the question what, on the
sense of ‘semantic contribution’ delineated by (SC1)–(SC2), the semantic contributions
of monadic first-order predicates are, then ‘SC’ must express that sense of ‘semantic con-
tribution’. So on our present proposal, Linnebo takes higher-orderism to be committed to
two claims, namely to the claim that the intended notion of semantic contributions can be
expressed by the second-order predicate ‘SC’, and to the claim expressed by (P1) on that
interpretation of ‘SC’. Call the conjunction of these claims (P1+).
I take it that this is what Linnebo has in mind. So let us now turn to the case of names.
Linnebo claims that according to higher-orderism, the semantic contributions of names
are the objects to which they refer. Since objects are properly represented only by first-
order variables, given what we have just said, the appropriate analogue to (P1) for names
is
(N) For every name n: ∃x sc(x, n).
Note that in order not to violate the rules of grammar, we have to take ‘sc’ in (N) to be a
first-order predicate, taking names or name variables in both argument places. As before,
if (N) is to express an answer to the question what, on the sense of ‘semantic contribution’
delineated by (SC1)–(SC2), the semantic contributions of names are, then ‘sc’ must ex-
press that sense of ‘semantic contribution’. So again, the view ascribed to higher-orderism
comprises two components: the claim that the intended notion of semantic contributions
can be expressed by the first-order predicate ‘sc’, and the claim expressed by (N) on that
interpretation of ‘sc’. Call the conjunction of these claims (N+).
One may well suspect that if Linnebo is right so far, then already, things have gone
badly wrong for higher-orderism. For one may well think that expressions which, like
‘sc’ and ‘SC’, belong to different syntactic categories, cannot possibly express one and
the same notion. And although this is not beyond reasonable doubt, the strategy for
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higher-orderists that I want to explore in this paper is to deny the claims about names and
predicates just presented. I shall therefore grant, for the sake of argument, that a version
of higher-orderism that is committed to these claims is untenable, and provide only a brief
sketch of how we might obtain that such a view carries commitments that are inexpressible
by its own lights.15 Thus, suppose we hold that ‘sc’ and ‘SC’ express a single notion of
semantic contribution. We should then also hold that the infinity of analogues of these
predicates for higher-order predicates express that notion as well. Given that we have this
notion, it seems as though we should be able to make general claims about the entire range
of semantic contributions, such as that it divides into infinitely many kinds – this is the
claim Infinity mentioned above. Yet by higher-orderist lights, any given variable belongs
to some order and therefore can range only over some semantic contributions: first-order
ones over those suitable for names, second-order ones over those suitable for predicates,
etc. If so, then although we have a general notion of semantic contributions, and there
seem to be interesting general truths about the entirety of semantic contributions, no such
truths can be expressed.
What reasons are there for taking higher-orderism to be committed to (N+) and (P1+)?
In the passage quoted above, Linnebo seems to consider this an immediate consequence
of the higher-orderists’ proposal concerning the regimentation of talk of interpretations.
On that proposal, we have the following principles concerning the interpretation of names
and predicates:
(12) ∀i ∀n ∃x x = i(n)
(13) ∀I ∀P ∃X ∀x (Xx↔ I(P,x))
The condition under which a given first-order predication pPnq is true under an interpre-
tation of the name and an interpretation of the predicate is then as follows:
(14) pPnq is truei,I ↔ I(P, i(n)).
The most plausible argument from these observations to the claim that higher-orderism is
committed to (N+) and (P1+), it seems to me, runs roughly as follows. Firstly, the singu-
lar term ‘i(n)’ plays a certain role in the higher-orderist’s treatment of names (12) such
that that role is played in the treatment of first-order predicates (13) by the predicational
15 It may be worth emphasizing that the concession I make here for the sake of argument is substantive,
and that it may also be possible to develop a tenable version of higher-orderism that endorses (P1+)
and (N+) but blocks Linnebo’s objection at a later stage. I make the concession here to bring into
clearer view the premise in Linnebo’s argument that I will argue the higher-orderist can reject.
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expression ‘I(P, . . .)’. At least in a rough approximation, this role can be described by say-
ing that ‘i(n)’ and ‘I(P, . . .)’ serve to specify the extra-linguistic correlates, or denotations,
under the relevant interpretations, of the names or predicates in question. Secondly, any
precise and strictly adequate reformulation of this rough, informal description will have
to make use of a single, unambiguous expression to regiment the informal talk of extra-
linguistic correlates or denotations. Thirdly, whatever notion is expressed by that putative
expression will render true (SC1)–(SC2) and thus constitute the obvious candidate for the
general notion of the semantic contribution of an expression.
The at any rate plausible third premise is actually redundant in that a straightfor-
ward variation on the above considerations regarding ‘sc’ and ‘SC’ will show the higher-
orderist to be in trouble as soon as he accepts the first two premises. For the attempt to
regiment talk of denotations by a single, unambiguous expression generates just the diffi-
culties we saw to arise given the assumption that ‘sc’ and ‘SC’ express a common notion.
It also seems very unpromising to deny that the somewhat vague first premise admits of
a reading on which it is correct by the lights of higher-orderism. I therefore recommend
that the higher-orderist reject the second premise. Since that premise, and more generally
the claim that there is a general notion of denotation, has some intuitive appeal, a mere
denial of that claim seems unsatisfactory. The higher-orderist’s case would be signifi-
cantly strengthened if he could give an explanation why the claim, although false, seems
intuitively attractive. Ideally, he would show that we should expect the claim to seem
plausible if his theory is correct.16 My aim in what follows is to make a case that he can
do so.
The next section shows how the higher-orderist can describe the common role played
by ‘i(n)’ and ‘I(P, . . .)’ in his treatments of names and predicates, respectively. I suggest
that, in combination with the observation that in natural language, we habitually and
unreflectively employ devices of nominalization to transform non-nominal expressions
into nominal, first-order ones, this account provides at least a partial explanation of the
intuitive appeal of the assumption of a general notion of denotation. That explanation can
be supplemented by the point that it is intuitively plausible that there is a general notion
of semantic contributions, playing roughly the role indicated by (SC1)–(SC2), and that the
putative general notion of denotation would seem suited to play this role.
16 This way of viewing the matter was suggested to me by Robbie Williams.
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4 A Hierarchy of ‘Denotation’-like Expressions
Where i is an interpretation of the names of some language L and n is such a a name, i(n)
is the denotation of n under i. We may write this formally as follows (‘=1’ is the ordinary
identity-predicate; the point of the subscripts will become clear shortly):
(15) ∀i ∀n deni1(n) =1 i(n)
Now it appears that the counterpart to ‘i(n)’ in the higher-orderist’s treatment of predicates
is the expression ‘I(P, . . .)’. First, to avoid the inconvenience of the gap-notation, let us
think of second-order ‘I’ not as a two-place predicate but an operator that combines with a
name to form a one-place predicate. We then write ‘I(P)(x)’ instead of ‘I(P,x)’ and ‘I(P)’
instead of ‘I(P, . . .)’. Roughly speaking, then, it appears that where I is an interpretation
of the first-order predicates of L, and P is such a predicate, I(P) is the denotation of P
under I. Strictly speaking, however, according to the version of higher-orderism that I
propose, this is incorrect. Specifically, it is incorrect as long as ‘denotation’ is taken here
in the same meaning in which it is taken in connection with names. So how can we do
justice to the impression that ‘I(P)’ plays the same role in connection with predicates that
‘i(n)’ plays in connection with names?
The strategy I shall pursue is as follows. First, we formulate strictly adequate coun-
terparts to (15) for first- and higher-order predicates. We then show that the counterparts
to ‘deni1’ in these principles, although different in meaning from it and from each other,
behave in an important way analogously to it. We may then take this analogy to be what
underlies the impression of a shared role. In addition, we may explain the intuitive appeal
of the claim that there is a single notion of denotation on which ‘i(n)’ and ‘I(P)’ serve to
specify the denotations of names and predicates, respectively, – i.e. the second premise
of the argument from the end of the last section – as resulting in part from a natural but
mistaken overestimation of the extent of the analogy.
We begin by formulating an analogue of (15) that has the right syntactic shape to ex-
press a correct principle concerning first-order predicates. Since we replace ‘i(n)’ by
‘I(P)’, we need to replace ‘=1’ by a second-order counterpart that conjoins first-order
predicates rather than names. We shall write that expression ‘=2’, leaving open for now
its exact interpretation. Accordingly, we need to replace the name-forming functor ‘deni1’
by a predicate-forming analogue, which we write ‘denI2’, obtaining as (15)’s counterpart
for first-order predicates:
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(16) ∀I ∀P denI2(P) =2 I(P)
We can also say what analogues of (15) and (16) for higher-order predicates will look
like. For the sake of generality, we indicate the form shared by all these principles with
(15) and (16). Say that names are constants of order 0, and let instances of ‘cn’ range over
the n’th-order constants of L. Rewrite ‘i’ as ‘i1’, ‘I’ as ‘i2’, its third-order counterpart as
‘i3’, etc. Then for any finite n, the instance of
(S-denn) ∀in ∀cn−1 deninn (cn−1) =n in(cn−1)
obtained by replacing ‘n’ with the numeral for n is the counterpart for n’th-order constants
to (15) and (16).17 Again, we postpone the question of the interpretation of instances of
‘=n’ for n > 1.
It is worth being clear first of all about what we cannot claim by way of an analogy
between the various ‘denotation’-like functors. Just as we cannot hold them to be syn-
onymous, we also cannot hold them to denote a common function. Indeed, on the present
view, there is no sense of ‘denote’ on which they all denote something. Nor can we hold
that there is a range of functions, each of them denoted, in some sense, by one of the
functors, which fall under a common, unambiguous predicate we could take to charac-
terize a kind of denotation-like function. More generally, what analogies our functors
sustain must be expressible in meta-linguistic terms, without reference to the meanings
of the functors. The most salient and interesting such analogy, I think, is that all these
functors show what I call a quasi-disquotational behaviour with respect to expressions of
their associated category. Let me explain what I mean by this.
It is often observed that the truth-predicate has a kind of disquotational function, in
that appending ‘is true’ to the quotation-name of a given interpreted (object language)
sentence S results in a meta-language sentence which is equivalent to (a meta-language
translation of) S.18 Something similar can be said about ‘the denotation of’: prefixing it
to the quotation-name of a name n produces a name that is equivalent to n. And the phrase
‘applies to’ has the analogous feature with respect to first-order predicates: appending it
to the quotation-name of a predicate P produces a predicate that is equivalent to P.
Can we specify a general sense for ‘disquoter for expressions of category C’ on which
each of our three examples comes out a disquoter for expressions of the respective cate-
17 Note that (S-denn) is a somewhat peculiar schema in that, in contrast to more familiar schemata such
as ‘Fa’ or ‘p→ q’, its instances have different internal syntactic structures.
18 I shall henceforth suppress the parenthetical qualifications. We may assume the meta-language to
extend the object language so that the relevant translation is simply the identity-mapping.
16
gories? In a first step, we say that
(Dis) D is a disquoter for expressions of category C↔d f :
D combines with a name to form an expression of category C &
if n is a name of an expression e of category C,
then pD(n)q is equivalent to e.
In a second step, we need to see if we can make satisfactory sense of the notion of equiv-
alence appealed to in (Dis). Since it is supposed to apply to names, predicates, and sen-
tences alike, we cannot explain it in terms of a semantic relation such as co-denotation.
For names, the intended condition of equivalence is satisfied iff pD(n) = eq is true.
For sentences it is satisfied iff pD(n) ↔ eq is true. For predicates, it is satisfied iff
p∀x (D(n)(x) ↔ e(x))q is true. The expressions ‘↔’, and ‘∀x (. . .x↔ x)’ are ‘=’-like
in that they satisfy analogues of the intersubstitutivity principle characteristic of ‘=’.19
That is, from pS↔ Tq and arbitrary Φ we may infer the result Φ(S/T ) of replacing some
or all occurrences of S in Φ by T , and from p∀x (Px↔ Qx)q and arbitrary Φ we may
infer Φ(P/Q). Analogous constructions for higher-order predicates can be obtained by
replacing the first-order quantifier with an appropriately higher-order one. We now define
a general notion of an identity-like operator for expressions of category C as follows:
(Id) Id is an identity-like operator for expressions of category C↔d f :
Id combines with two expressions of category C to form a sentence &
if e1 and e2 are expressions of category C,
then from pId(e1,e2)q and arbitrary Φ we may infer Φ(e1/e2).
We may then take the intended general condition of equivalence between expressions
e1 and e2 in (Dis) to be that filling the argument places of an identity-like operator for
expressions of category C with e1 and e2 results in a true sentence.
Let us return to the instances of (S-denn). We are now in a position to say how the
higher-order versions of ‘=’ we have made use of can be interpreted: we may simply
regard them as abbreviations of the appropriate identity-like constructions just charac-
terized.20 Given this interpretation, the instances of ‘deni
n
n ’ turn out to show a quasi-
disquotational behaviour. Since they carry a parameter for an interpretation, they of course
19 This of course holds only for extensional languages; for intensional languages, we should have to
make use of intensional operators to construct ‘=’-like expressions for non-names.
20 We may also read ‘deni
2
2 ’ as ‘applies
i2 to’. Unsurprisingly, there do not seem to be any independently
familiar expressions of English corresponding to the ‘denotation’-functors for higher-order predicates.
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do not satisfy the definition (Dis). Relative to a given interpretation i of names, however,
when combined with a name of a name c, pdeni1q forms a name which is equivalent
to any expression that adequately translates c under i. Indeed, if we allow pi(c)q as a
translation of c under i, this is immediate from the relevant instance of (S-denn). Corre-
sponding results are equally straightforwardly obtained for the other instances of ‘deni
n
n ’.
The higher-orderist’s many ‘denotation’-predicates are therefore analogous in that they
all behave quasi-disquotationally for expressions of the relevant categories. Based on this
observation, we can now describe a role that is played by ‘i(n)’ in the higher-orderist’s
treatment of names, and by ‘I(P)’ in the treatment of first-order predicates, and so on:
they are equivalent to – i.e. intersubstitutable with – quasi-disquotations of the relevant
expressions.
This observation also enables us to give a plausible explanation of the intuitive appeal
of the claim that there is a unified notion of denotation. For simplicity, we consider the de-
parameterized ‘denotation’-functors that disquote with respect to intended interpretations.
Their shared disquotational character means that their inferential profiles are essentially
the same, modulo the differences in grammatical category between the expressions they
combine with. Thus, where ‘a’ is an (object language) name, we have ‘den1(“a”) =1 a’,
from which we obtain the intersubstitutivity of ‘den1(“a”)’ and ‘a’, and where ‘F’ is a
first-order predicate, we have ‘den2(“F”) =2 F’, from which we obtain the intersubstitu-
tivity of ‘den2(“F”)’ and ‘F’. It is therefore natural to suspect that these principles are
merely superficially different manifestations of general laws of general notions of deno-
tation and identity. Moreover, we could easily subsume the higher-order principles under
the putative general first-order laws if we allowed ourselves free use of familiar devices
for nominalizing non-nominal expressions, turning, say,
(17) den2(‘is heavy’) =2 is heavy
into the first-order paraphrase
(18) den1(‘is heavy’) =1 the property of being heavy
Since this kind of transformation is something that in natural language and in informal
theorizing, we frequently and unreflectively carry out, it is to be expected that we should
find it very plausible to consider as consequences of a theory claims that can be obtained
from the theory essentially just by means of nominalization.21
21 It is worth mentioning that the higher-orderist may have independent reasons to use this kind of argu-
ment to explain the intuitive appeal of claims he rejects. In particular, it seems intuitively plausible
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5 Conclusion
Higher-orderism holds quantification of any (finite) order to be a legitimate, sui generis
kind of quantification, an adequate semantics for which must itself employ quantification
of at least the same order. Linnebo has argued that the view commits its proponents to
the truth of certain general semantic clams that by their own lights are not expressible. In
response, I have shown that his objection relies on the assumption that there is a general
notion of the semantic contribution of an expression that picks out an extra-linguistic cor-
relate of that expression. I have then tried to make a case that this assumption, and thus
Linnebo’s objection, can plausibly be resisted by higher-orderists. Specifically, I have
suggested that to speak of the extra-linguistic correlates of expressions, higher-orderists
may use a hierarchy of predicates of different orders, mirroring the hierarchy of syntac-
tic categories in the object language. I conclude that although further investigation into
the resulting view may be required before we can make a confident judgement about its
adequacy, at the very least, the present proposal constitutes a promising start to a higher-
orderist response to Linnebo’s challenge.
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